Explain why the open war Essay Example for Free

Explain why the open war Essay World War 1 had begun in August with both sides certain that their sudden attacks with cavalry and infantry would create a war of rapid movement, which would bring them a swift victory. The ending of this possibility and build up towards a stationary war of fixed entrenchment was not only due to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII, but the problems in communications, problems faced through tactics and strategies and the role of the commanders throughout the planning and progression of the war. The possibility of further outflanking movements was gone. The initially hastily constructed trenches of the allied forcers took on a more permanent look as two massive armies consisting of over 4 million men faced each other over 800 kilometres of continuous trench lines from the coast of Belgium to the Swiss border. For the next four years, the rival commanders struggled and blundered in an attempt to find a way to break the stalemate, which had emerged by the end of 1914. In order to break the stalemate there were two major offensives remembered from 1916, which both failed but were attempts none the less. Both sides had become aware that it was easier to hold a defensive position than it was to launch an offensive. However, this did not stop them, launching repeated disastrous offensives, relying on weight of men, artillery and supplies to crumble the opposition through attrition and each side endeavored to weaken the other. The generals decided only a big push would be able to break through the enemy lines and restart the war of rapid movement. This was not achieved until the attrition of 1915-18 finally weakened the German lines in mid-1918. The Schlieffen Plan, originally devised by Alfred von Schlieffen, the then German Army Chief of Staff, in 1905, was the German Plan which would they would implement to avoid a war on two fronts. Schlieffen argued that France had to be defeated as soon as possible in the event of a great European War. If that were to happen, Schlieffen realised that Russia and France would be unwilling to continue fighting. In addition, Schlieffen estimated that it would take Russia six weeks to mobilise her forces in preparation for war against them. Thus, he reasoned that Germany would have six weeks in which to defeat France and surrender. On August 2nd 1914 the Schlieffen Plan was put into effect and the German Army began its advance upon France through Belgium. The delicate plan was upset with the early arrival of the British Expeditionary Force under Sir John French, significant resistance by the Belgian Army, resistance of the Belgians and the early arrival of Russian Forces. The German implementations and strategies relied too heavily on the Schlieffen Plan itself. The plan greatly depended on speed and movement, the strict deadline of 42 days was impractical, this unreasonable goal was pushed further away from the Germans. General von Moltke did not follow through the original Schlieffen Plan; instead, he had shifted the numbers of the planned armies and therefore altered the balance for the plan to work. All these events led up to the Battle of the Marne, the first major battle on the Western Front. The French Allied victory at this battle marked the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, and the death of any German hope for a quick decisive victory. The German forces were not only to blame for the reason of stationary war during 1914, the problems with the French Plan XVII also contributed to the fact.

Web Page Creation Report :: Computer Science

Web Page Creation Report In order to create my web pages, I used a program called FrontPage Express. This allowed me to create web pages without learning the language they are written in, HTML. To start with, I created a new directory for the website to go in to. I did this by clicking on File>New>Folder. I then renamed the folder just created to Computerstore. Into that folder, I created five more folders, and renamed them Images, INP, OUT, MPU and STO. These were for the four different sections of products and for the images. My next task was to create the index page. In FrontPage Express, I created a new page by clicking on File>New>Normal Page. I then right-clicked on the page and selected page properties. I could then change the background colour. After I found that none of the preset colours were suitable, I created a custom colour by entering different amounts of Red, Blue, and Green until I found a colour that I liked. I then added this to the custom colours list so I could use it on the other pages. I then set all of the text and hyperlink colours to black so that all the text on the page would the same colour. Whilst I was in page properties, I added the page title that would be shown at the top of the browser by typing the title I wanted into the title box. With the properties set how I wanted, I could lay out the page. I wanted to add a table on the page, to contain the hyperlinks to the other pages. To do this, I clicked on Table>Insert Table, and entered the size of table I wanted, as shown to the left. I then formatted the table by right clicking on the outline, and selecting Table Properties. I added a border of size 10, aligned the table to the centre, and coloured the border navy, as shown to the right. I clicked OK and went back to the home page. I added the section names into the table, and added a two-line title. Using the defaults, the page looked like the image to shown above. I then formatted all of the text into a different font, Franklin Gothic Heavy. I then changed the size of the first line of the title to the largest, size 7, and underlined it. My newly formatted homepage now looked like this. I saved the file into the main directory as index.htm. In order to create the index pages for the sub-directories, I used the homepage as a template. For each index page, all I would need to do was to change

How has the role of the nation-state changed in a globalised society?

Introduction There has been considerable debate about whether globalisation has changed the role of the nation-state. While a somewhat nebulous concept, a nation-state can be defined as a geopolitical entity deriving its legitimacy through the service of a sovereign population or nation (Holton 2011; Croucher 2004). Globalisation can be loosely understood as the increasing political, cultural, and economic interaction of international populations (Al-Rodhan et al. 2006). This essay will look at the changing role of the nation-state in the modern period of globalisation (post-WWII), although there is certainly much to be said about earlier periods. In terms of structure, it will begin by considering economic, political, and cultural changes. This will be juxtaposed by the following section outlining arguments that downplay the relationship between globalisation and the nation-state. It will be concluded that the nation-state has undergone substantial change in the globalised world, but that there remains a great deal of structural continuity. Globalisation has the changed the economic role of the nation-state in several respects. Cerny (1995) suggests an erosion of the ability to provide all three main kinds of public good: regulatory, productive/distributive, and redistributive. One ‘good’ in the first category is a stable currency, the control of which has traditionally fallen within the remit of the national banks or their equivalents. This is still theoretically true, but today foreign governments, organisations, or even individuals can play a critical role because of globalisation. One need only consider Black Wednesday (16 September, 1992) in Britain, when George Soros ‘broke the Bank of England’ by short-selling the pound, or the gradual accumulation of American dollars by China due to the latter’s trade surplus, to see how globalisation has stripped the nation-state of much of its power in terms of controlling currency. In the world o f rapid communication, especially via the internet, the situation has become even more difficult to control (Goksel 2004; Evans 1997; Cerny 1995). In addition, globalisation often means the presence of numerous foreign firms within national borders, which can lead to currency fluctuations as a result of foreign remittances. The rapid transfer of economic instability across borders, as was the case during the global financial crisis (2007-8) or the financial crisis in East Asia (1997-8), shows how the role of the nation-state in maintaining economic order has been eroded more generally (Goksel 2004). It is argued by Strange (1997) and others that the balance of economic power has shifted in favour of multinational corporations (MNCs). They believe this process began in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s because of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the USA, but that it has increased since the 1980s due to the influence of Japanese and Western European FDI. The recent revelation that th e Trans-Pacific Partnership might bring in legislation allowing MNCs to override American national laws, by appealing to an international tribunal, suggests that there might soon be a significant reduction in the economic powers of the nation-state (Carter 2012). It is impossible to speak of the economic effects of globalisation without also discussing the political consequences. The most important forces in this respect are the supranational bodies to which many nation-states now belong, such as the EU (European Union), which regulates the labour markets, industrial organisation, business practices and trade conditions of its member states. Moreover, the majority of member states have relinquished their former currencies in favour of the Euro, which has meant transference of monetary policy over from sovereign national banks to the European Central Bank (ECB) (Goksel 2004). There are a significant number of other trade blocs (customs unions, common markets, monetary unions) across the globe, such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) or the SAARC (South American Association for Regional Cooperation), which operate under similar conditions. These are symptoms and perpetuators of globalisation, all of which represent a diminishment of the economic independence of nation-states. In the 20th century there has been a blossoming of trade blocs, but it should be noted that they go back long before the era of modern globalisation, with the first probably being the 13th-century Hanseatic League (Milner 2002). Large political collectives have had a significant effect on the role of the nation-state in other respects. The state’s role in the globalised world often now includes broader, international objectives focused on sweeping environmental, social, economic or other concerns (Evans 1997). The EU has a budget to which member states must contribute, which further reduces the economic sovereignty of participating nation-states (Wolf 2001; Holton 2011; G oksel 2004). Likewise, groups such as the G7, G8, and G20, which consist of the largest economies in the world, impose new obligations on nation-states, related to issues such as energy consumption, ozone depletion, or acid rain, among others (Goksel 2004). Some of obligations date back many decades, such as the United Nations’ (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1948. The importance of supranational political actors in particular can perhaps best be seen in the security sphere. Historically, the defence of the populous has been one of the central roles of the nation-state, and to certain extent the main justification for its power (Held 1998; Held and McGrew 1998). It is noted by Strange (1997) that this obligation has largely been removed in some cases from the hands of individual nations, which rely instead on multilateral agreements. As Goksel (2004: 2) puts it, ‘Armies are often kept not so much to enforce terr itorial claims or to extend them, but rather to maintain civil order.’ The state’s role in providing defence has been altered in order to allow it to fit into a new system of global defence agreements. The traditional military role of the nation-state, which focused on ‘the acquisition, employment and use of military force to achieve national goals’, has been abandoned in many cases today (Held 1998: 226). In a certain sense this is fitting because there are now many global security concerns, such as terrorism, that require multilateral cooperation in matters of intelligence gathering. This has diminished the traditional role of the nation-state in guiding its own defence policy, but in some cases it has enhanced its position. For example, Hobsbawm (2007: 137) believes that by exaggerating the terrorist threat American has been ‘inventing enemies that legitimise the expansion and use of its global power’. Globalisation has perhaps expanded and diminished the security role of the nation-state, depending on where one looks. In either case, however, there has been change. There is also a cultural argument to be considered. The nation-state has been an important locus of identity for individuals and communities for centuries. How long exactly is a matter of fierce controversy, and this topic has divided IR (international relations) scholars into three dominant schools: the primordialists, the ethnosymbolists (e.g., Smith 1987, 1995, 2009), and the modernists (e.g., Hobsbawn 1990; Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983). In any case, it is argued by modernists such as Hobsbawm (1990) that the nation-state’s role as a cultural and social identifier is gradually being eroded as supranational alternatives emerge. This is supported by the fact that in a globalised society flows of information and ideas are rapid, unpredictable, and unrestricted by national boundaries. Platforms such as the internet, for example, are the great facilit ators of new forms of indentify that chip away at the traditional position of the nation-state (Hobsbawm 1990). It is not universally accepted, however, that the role of the nation-state has changed in the globalised world. There has been particular criticism of the idea that globalisation might lead to the ‘end of the nation-state’ or otherwise drastically diminish its role, arguments synonymous with the modernist school of International Relations (e.g., Evans 1997; Strange 1997; Ohmae 1995; Hobsbawm 1990; Gellner 1983). Holton (2011) argues that nation-states are still the most important of the actors in the global sphere, despite the influence of supranational organisations. For Holton, it is simply the case that the role of the nation-state has to be reframed in global terms. He does, however, acknowledge that some have experienced a curtailment of their economic and political role through a lack of bargaining power, as the cases of the budgetary crisis in EU member states, such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain, reveal. Hirst and Thompson (1996) do not believe that any trend towards a more globalised world (something they are sceptical of in the first place) has had a significant impact on the nation-state. They note that while decisions are often passed on to multinational bodies, it falls to individual countries to make decisions within this framework. One might argue, however, that arguments such as this underestimate the independence of self-contained, highly secretive governing bodies such as the European Commission. Hirst and Thompson (1996) are particularly critical of the suggestion that globalisation has diminished the role of the nation-state, contending instead that the enhanced ‘possibilities of national and international governance’ have actually strengthened it. Gilpin (2000) takes a similar line, arguing that many of the changes in the role of the nation-state cannot be attributed to increasing globalisation. Rather, they are part of a pattern dating back to before WWI when the Gold Standard was in place. Indeed, the Gold Standard is a relic of the pre-globalisation world, yet it stripped the state of currency control nearly to the same extent as modern monetary unions (Gilpin 2000). Through this lens, the ‘state may be reverting to its 19th-century role in the economy’, which suggests that many of the changes seen today would be equally operative in the ‘pre-globalisation’ world. Goksel (2004) argues that although globalisation has changed the role of the nation-state, it is important not to view this as something that was guaranteed to happen. In this sense he argues against the ‘deterministic approach’ of scholars such as Strange (1997). This is valid observation with reference to certain elements of globalisation, and it is true that in theory no nation-state is obliged to submit powers to supranational organisations. However, it is not valid wi th regard to issues such as the dissemination of technology, where the role of the state in controlling national information was always going to be diminished as the world become more globalised. Goksel (2004: 11) also points to the fact that in a very basic way the role of the nation-state has remained the same as ‘there are structural obstacles to the withering away of the state. Votes have to be cast somewhere, taxes have to be paid to particular authorities, which can be held accountable for public services such as education and health. Moreover, states continue to create a regulatory environment for their economies.’ Arguments such as these highlight the importance of not overstating the case for globalisation as a force for change. In conclusion, the role of the nation-state has been reformed by the globalised world. There are a few possible exceptions to this, such as the highly insular North Korea, but such cases are anomalies. In economic terms, there has been a tendency either for the state to lose power to supranational bodies, or to have it eroded by global forces largely beyond its control. The same is true of the political sphere, in which nation-states have generally found their freedoms curtailed by wider forces, or in some cases extended due to advantageous positioning within multinational organisations, such as is the case with the United States and the UN. Nevertheless, there has been an element of structural consistency in the role of nation-states insofar as they are still the predominant actors in international politics, and most of the functions of supranational and other bodies rely on them. The nation-state remains indispensible and arguments that suggest its demise are overstated. The boundaries of this debate, however, are far from fixed, as the proposed legislation related to corporations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership demonstrates. No doubt it is too early to predict the future of the nation-state in the globalised world, but it has certainly undergone change so far. Word count: 1986 Reference List: Al-Rodhan, R.F. Nayef and Stoudmann, G. (2006). Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition http://www.sustainablehistory.com/articles/definitions-of-globalization.pdf [Retrieved 06/01/2014] Carter, Z. (2012) Obama Trade Document Leaked, Revealing New Corporate Powers and Broken Campaign Promises. Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/13/obama-trade-document-leak_n_1592593.html [Retrieved 05/01/2014] Cerny, P. G. (1995) Globalisation and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, International Organization, 49 (4), pp. 595-625 Croucher, S. L. (2004) Globalization and Belonging, Lanham, Md.: Rowman &? Littlefield. Evans, P. (1997) The Eclipse of the State?: Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalisation, World Politics, 50, pp. 62-87 Gellner, E. (1983) Nation and Nationalism, Blackwell: Oxford Gilpin, R. (2000) The Challenge of Global Capitalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Goksel. N. K. (2004) Globalisation and the State, Centre for Strategic Research http://sam.gov.tr/globalisation-and-the-state/ [Retrieved 06/01/2014] Held, D. (1989) Political Theory and the Modern State, Stanford California: Stanford University Press Held, D. and McGrew, A. (1998) The End of the Old OrderReview of International Studies, 24 Hirst, P. Q. and Thompson, G. (1996) Globalisation in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, Cambridge: Blackwell Hobsbawm E. (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press Hobsbawm, E (2007) Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism, London: Abacus Holton, R. J. (2011) Globalization and the Nation State, (2nd ed.) Basingstoke: Palgrave, Macmillan Milner, H. V (2002) International Trade in Carlsnaes, W.; Risse, T., Simmons, B. A., Handbook of International Relations. London: SAGE Publications. Ohmae, K. (1995) The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies, London: Harper Collins Shaw, M. (1997) The state of globalisation : towards a theory of state transformation. Review of International Political Economy, 4, 3, pp. 497-513 Smith, A. D, (2009) Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach, Routledge Strange, S. (1997) The Erosion of the State, Current History, 96 (613), pp. 365-369 Wolf, M. (2001) Will the Nation-State Survive GlobalisationForeign Affairs, Vol. 80, 1, pp. 178-190

The 90s